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Fuentes, Circuit Judge: 
 Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania (“DIA”) has filed 
suit claiming that the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”)’s failure to make certain 
portions of its facilities accessible to individuals with 
disabilities after undertaking construction work at those 
facilities violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. (“RA”).  On appeal from the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DIA, 
SEPTA argues that certain regulations issued by the 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) implementing the 
ADA establish that it was not required to make those portions 
of its facilities handicapped-accessible.  For the reasons given 
below, we affirm.  
I. 
A.  Background 
 The facts of this case are fairly straightforward.  
Appellant SEPTA, an agency and instrumentality of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, provides public 
transportation, including train, subway, trolley, and 
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paratransit services in five counties of Pennsylvania.  The 
dispute in this case concerns two separate SEPTA 
construction projects that involved a total of three of its 
stations in Philadelphia.  
The first of these stations, the 15th and Market Street 
subway station, serves the Market-Frankford Elevated 
Subway Line.  This station is not accessible to individuals 
with disabilities.  It is connected with the second station in 
question, Suburban Station, via the extensive underground 
Penn Center Concourse, which is lined with shops and 
offices.  Suburban Station is a regional rail station.1  On the 
concourse level connecting Suburban Station and 15th Street 
Station, at approximately 15th Street and Market, is a 
courtyard (“the 15th Street Courtyard”).  Through 
underground travel, it is possible to reach either Suburban 
Station or 15th and Market Street Station from the 15th Street 
Courtyard.2     
In February 2001, as part of a larger renovation 
project, SEPTA received a permit from the City of 
Philadelphia (the “City”) to begin replacement of the only 
stairway in the 15th Street Courtyard.  The stairs, which had 
become unusable, were demolished and replaced, but no 
modifications were made to any load-bearing structure of the 
15th Street Courtyard.  The work was concluded in August 
2002.   This project had a budget of approximately $1.5 
million dollars; SEPTA’s expert estimated that the cost of 
installing an elevator in addition to the stairs would have 
made the project $810,000 more expensive.   SEPTA has not 
                                          
1 “The SEPTA Regional Rail Division provides commuter 
rail service on thirteen branches to over 150 active stations in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and its suburbs.”  Wikipedia, 
SEPTA Regional Rail, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEPTA_Regional_Rail (last 
visited November 8, 2010). 
2 The parties dispute whether the 15th Street Courtyard is 
an entrance to the 15th and Market Street Station or to 
Suburban Station.  The District Court did not resolve this 
issue, and we do not find it necessary to resolve it in order to 
determine this case. 
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contended that it would be technically infeasible to install an 
elevator at that site.   
Suburban Station is a “key station” in the SEPTA 
system and is therefore subject to special accessibility 
requirements under the ADA.  In 2005, as part of its efforts to 
comply with those accessibility requirements, SEPTA 
installed two elevators in Suburban Station.  The entrance to 
one of these elevators is on street level at 16th Street between 
Market Street and JFK Blvd., making it theoretically possible 
for a person using a wheelchair to descend there to the Penn 
Center Concourse and travel underground to the 15th Street 
Courtyard.  Otherwise, the 15th Street Courtyard is 
inaccessible to individuals using wheelchairs.     
The third station in question, City Hall Subway 
Station, is located at Broad Street and Market Street and 
serves the Broad Street Subway Line.3  It, too, is inaccessible 
to those in wheelchairs.  Before 2002, there was an 
inoperative escalator leading from a courtyard at the 
concourse level of City Hall Subway Station  to street level in 
the southeast corner of Philadelphia City Hall Courtyard (the 
“City Hall Courtyard”).       
In June 2001, SEPTA undertook extensive repairs to 
the inoperative escalator at City Hall Courtyard by, among 
other things, replacing the internal mechanisms within the 
escalator’s wheelwell.  Again, no modifications were made to 
any load-bearing structures.  The repairs at City Hall 
Courtyard cost approximately $1.2 million; SEPTA estimates 
that the cost of installing an elevator there would raise the 
total cost to $3.2 million.  However, SEPTA has not claimed 
that it would be technically infeasible to install an elevator 
there, so long as it had sufficient access to the property.4   
                                          
3 City Hall Subway Station is not connected to either 
Suburban Station or the 15th Street Station. 
4 City Hall Courtyard is owned by the City of 





B. The District Court’s Decision 
Appellee DIA is a nonprofit group which advocates for 
the civil rights of persons with disabilities.  It filed a lawsuit 
against SEPTA in March 2003 alleging that SEPTA had 
violated both Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act5 
by failing to make the 15th Street Courtyard accessible to 
those with disabilities after replacing the stairway at that 
location.  SEPTA moved to dismiss, arguing that the City was 
a required party to the litigation because the City owns the 
15th Street Courtyard.  That motion was granted as 
unopposed, but the Court subsequently vacated its order and 
DIA amended its complaint to add the City as a defendant.  In 
October 2003, DIA filed a second amended complaint.  DIA 
amended its complaint a third time in January 2004, adding 
an allegation that SEPTA was required to make City Hall 
Station accessible because that station constituted a “key 
station” as defined by the ADA and relevant regulations.     
In August 2004, DIA and the City reached a settlement 
in which the City agreed to permit SEPTA to use the City’s 
property to install an elevator at the 15th Street Courtyard.6  
In order to resolve DIA’s claim that City Hall Station was a 
key station required to be made handicapped accessible, the 
City indicated that it would “give permission … for SEPTA 
to [] construct the City Hall Station renovation project which 
has been discussed by SEPTA and the Plaintiffs in conceptual 
form for years.”  It appears that the “renovation project” 
referenced by the settlement pertains to the construction of an 
elevator at Dilworth Plaza, which is a different location than 
                                          
5 The analysis below applies to both the ADA and the RA 
claims.  “In light of the similarities between ... the ADA and 
RA and their implementing regulations, we construe and 
apply them in a consistent manner.”  Pennsylvania Prot. and 
Advocacy, Inc. v Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 402 
F.3d 374, 379 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005). 
6 SEPTA was not a party to the settlement reached 
between DIA and the City.  
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the City Hall Courtyard.7  The District Court dismissed the 
City from the action in light of the settlement.    
DIA’s fourth and final complaint was filed on 
February 15, 2005.  The fourth amended complaint, which 
named only SEPTA as a defendant, asserted two claims.  
Count I contended that SEPTA violated the ADA and RA by 
making “alterations” to the 15th Street Courtyard and the City 
Hall Courtyard without also making the affected portions of 
the facilities accessible to individuals with disabilities.  That 
was the first time in the litigation that DIA alleged that the 
extensive work conducted on the escalator at City Hall 
Courtyard constituted an “alteration” within the meaning of 
the ADA.  Count II alleged that SEPTA had violated the 
ADA and RA by failing to make 15th Street Station and City 
Hall Station, both allegedly “key stations” within the meaning 
of the ADA and RA, handicapped accessible. DIA sought 
relief in the form of, among other things, an injunction 
requiring SEPTA “to begin construction immediately of 
elevators [] at the [15th Street Courtyard Entrance] to the 
Market-Frankford ... Line and at the City Hall Station 
Courtyard’s Northwest and Southeast entrances to the Broad 
Street Subway Line to assure access for persons with 
disabilities, including persons who use wheelchairs ... .”   
DIA and SEPTA later moved for summary judgment 
against each other.  In November 2006, the District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of SEPTA, holding that 
DIA’s claims were time-barred.  On appeal, we reversed the 
District Court’s decision and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  See Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  After remand, both parties again moved for 
summary judgment on the remaining claims.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of DIA, finding 
that SEPTA’s work at both the 15th Street Courtyard and City 
Hall Courtyard constituted “alterations”  which triggered 
requirements under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to 
make both locations “readily accessible to” individuals with 
disabilities.      
                                          
7 Elevators at Dilworth Plaza would provide those with 
disabilities access to City Hall Station via the concourse level. 
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SEPTA has now appealed the District Court’s 
decision. 
II. 
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
summary judgment ruling.”   Melrose, Inc. v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Summary 
judgment is appropriate only where, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (citing Ruehl 
v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 The ADA “provide[s] a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2010).  
In enacting the law, Congress found that “discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be a serious 
and pervasive problem” in American society and therefore 
sought to “assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for 
individuals with disabilities.  Id. § 12101(a)(2), (7).  In 
particular, one of the ADA’s aims is the elimination of 
“architectural [and] transportation ... barriers” to full 
participation in society by individuals with disabilities by, 
among other things, mandating the improvement of access to 
public transit.  Id. § 12101(a)(5).  Therefore, although it does 
not generally mandate that existing public transit facilities be 
made accessible, the ADA does impose specific requirements 
on public entities which build new facilities or make 
“alterations” to existing facilities.   
“With respect to alterations of an existing facility or 
part thereof used in [public transit] that affect ... the usability 
of the facility or part thereof,” the ADA provides that it is 
discriminatory for a public entity to “fail to make such 
alterations ... in such a manner that, to the maximum extent 
feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily 
accessible to” individuals with disabilities.  42 U.S.C. § 
12147(a) (2010) (emphases added).  “Thus, while Congress 
chose not to mandate full accessibility to existing facilities, it 
required that subsequent changes to a facility be undertaken 
in a non-discriminatory manner.”  Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 
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F.3d 1067, 1073 (3d Cir. 1993).  In other words, if a public 
entity chooses to make changes rising to the level of 
“alterations” to a facility, it ordinarily must use that 
opportunity to make the altered part of the facility accessible, 
as well.   
In order to resolve this case, we must consider in turn 
the meaning of the phrases “alterations,” “the maximum 
extent feasible,” and “readily accessible” and then their 
application to the SEPTA projects at issue. 
A.  “Alterations” 
 Section 12147(a) of title 42 does not define the terms 
“alterations” or “the maximum extent feasible.”  However, 
the DOT has issued regulations that provide additional 
guidance as to their meaning.  The implementing regulations 
set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 37.43(a)(1) echo the requirements of 
42 U.S.C. § 12147(a).  The regulations define “alterations” to 
mean  
a change to an existing facility, including, but 
not limited to, remodeling, renovation, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, historic 
restoration, changes or rearrangement in 
structural parts or elements, and changes or 
rearrangement in the plan configuration of walls 
... [but not] [n]ormal maintenance, reroofing, 
painting or wallpapering, asbestos removal, or 
changes to mechanical or electrical systems ... 
unless they affect the usability of the building or 
facility.  
49 C.F.R. § 37.3.  Therefore, “an ‘alteration’ within the 
meaning of the regulations is a change that affects the 
usability of the facility involved.”  Kinney, 9 F.3d at 1072.  
“Usability” in this context has “an expansive, remedial 
construction” and “should be broadly defined to include 
renovations which affect the use of a facility, and not simply 
changes which relate directly to access.”  Id. at 1072-73 
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted).   SEPTA 
argued in the District Court that the replacement of the 
stairway at the 15th Street Courtyard and the elevator repair 
work at the City Hall Courtyard were not alterations, but 
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rather final acts of maintenance.  As the District Court noted, 
however, replacing an unusable stairway with a usable one 
and extensively changing an inoperative escalator so that it 
operates again surely affects the “usability” of the locations 
they service.  The complete replacement of a stairway or total 
overhaul of an escalator should also be considered 
“remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation [or] reconstruction” in 
the ordinary sense of those words.       
SEPTA has now abandoned the “final act of 
maintenance” argument and instead points to certain 
Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines 
(“ADAAG”) standards incorporated into the DOT 
regulations, which it contends further limit the types of 
construction which are “alterations” under the ADA.8  It 
claims that the District Court did not give appropriate 
deference to these regulations, as mandated by Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984).  In particular, SEPTA relies on an ADAAG 
provision which reads:  
 If an escalator or stair is planned or installed 
where none existed previously and major 
structural modifications are necessary for such 
installation, then a means of accessible vertical 
access shall be provided that complies with the 
applicable provisions. 
ADAAG § 4.1.6(1)(f).  SEPTA argues that this indicates that 
“alterations,” at least with respect to stairs, includes only 
changes that involve “major structural modifications.”  As it 
did not undertake “major structural modifications” of either 
the 15th Street or the City Hall Courtyards, it contends, it is 
not required to install an elevator in either location.   
We assume, and DIA does not dispute, that the DOT 
regulations should be given Chevron deference in this case.  
However, the courts owe no deference to SEPTA’s own 
interpretation of these regulations, and, as the District Court 
concluded, SEPTA’s interpretation is too narrow.  The ADA 
                                          
8 The relevant ADAAG standards are the 1991 version, 
codified at 49 C.F.R. Pt. 37, App. A. 
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is a remedial statute, meant to bring an end to discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities in all aspects of American 
life; it must be construed with all the liberality necessary to 
achieve such purposes.  In our view, the construction carried 
out by SEPTA in both the 15th Street Courtyard and the City 
Hall Courtyard constituted “alterations” under the ADA, even 
without “major structural alterations.” Although ADAAG § 
4.1.6(1)(f) addresses one scenario in which an accessible 
means of vertical access must be provided, it does not clearly 
indicate that this is the only scenario in which such access 
must be provided.   
SEPTA’s reading is at odds with the otherwise broad 
accessibility mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a) and 49 C.F.R. 
§ 37.43 and the expansive definition of “usability” adopted by 
this Circuit.  In Kinney, we held that even the resurfacing of a 
road through the laying down of a new layer of asphalt was 
an “alteration” sufficient to require that the road be made 
accessible through curb cuts, 9 F.3d at 1073-74; it cannot be 
that the much more substantial change of a complete 
replacement of a set of stairs or an escalator is not an 
“alteration” unless it is accompanied by major structural 
modifications.         
 The DOT regulations confirm this conclusion.  
SEPTA must “mee[t] the requirements of [49 C.F.R. § 37] 
and the requirements set forth in [the ADAAG].”  49 C.F.R. § 
37.9(a) (emphasis added).  This language indicates that public 
entities must fulfill both § 37 and the ADAAG requirements.  
The DOT did not envisage the ADAAG by themselves to be 
an exhaustive statement of regulatory requirements, but rather 
to be a supplement to the requirements imposed by § 37.  
Meeting the requirements of Section 4.1.6(1)(f) is not, then, 
necessarily sufficient to meet the requirements of  § 37, and it 
would be illogical to read Section 4.1.6(1)(f) of the ADAAG 
to radically curtail the broad mandate of § 37.   
Given that the ADA is to be liberally construed to 
effectuate its purpose of eliminating discrimination, we will 
not adopt SEPTA’s narrow interpretation of “alterations.”  In 
our view, the construction carried out by SEPTA in both the 
15th Street Courtyard and the City Hall Courtyard constituted 
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“alterations” under the ADA, even though it did not entail 
“major structural alterations.” 
B. “Maximum extent feasible” 
The parties also differ over the meaning of the phrase 
“maximum extent feasible.”  Again, this term is defined in the 
relevant DOT regulations: “the phrase [‘]to the maximum 
extent feasible[’] applies to the occasional case where the 
nature of an existing facility makes it impossible to comply 
fully with applicable accessibility standards ... .” 49 C.F.R. § 
37.43(b).  DIA argues that “feasible” refers only to technical 
feasibility, relying on this definition’s lack of explicit 
reference to costs.  SEPTA, in turn, argues that “feasible” 
must refer to economic feasibility, as well.9   
We have never addressed the meaning of “maximum 
extent feasible” under the ADA as applied to alterations in 
public transit facilities.  SEPTA’s position that “maximum 
extent feasible” must refer to economic as well as technical 
feasibility might be plausible if that language stood alone.  
However, the narrowness of the exception established in 49 
C.F.R. § 37.43(b), which contemplates that the infeasibility of 
making the altered portion of a facility will be only 
“occasional” and will arise from “the nature of an existing 
facility”—not from the budget limitations of a transportation 
authority, which must be reckoned with at all times—weighs 
in favor of DIA’s interpretation.   
In addition, both 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a) and 49 C.F.R. § 
37.43 do contain provisions for the consideration of cost in 
making public transit facilities accessible, but only in 
different sections establishing requirements for certain 
additional changes (e.g., to the bathrooms and drinking 
fountains) that must be made “to the maximum extent 
                                          
9 Although SEPTA has provided information that the costs 
of installing elevators at the two courtyards might be 
disproportionate to the cost of the rest of the construction 
projects there, it has not actually argued before us that the 
installation of the elevators was truly economically infeasible, 




feasible” if an area that serves a “primary function” is altered.  
The costs for those additional changes should not be 
“disproportionate.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a); 49 C.F.R. § 
37.43(a)(2).  The sections addressing “alterations” in general 
contain no such language.  The omission of any reference to 
costs there, when they are mentioned in closely-related 
sections, indicates that the ADA and the DOT regulations 
define feasibility primarily with respect to technical, not 
purely economic, concerns.10   
The Second Circuit recently reached the same 
conclusion with respect to identical language in Title III of 
the ADA and the relevant federal regulations (specifically, 42 
U.S.C. § 12183 and 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(c)).  Focusing on the 
language of the statute, it held that the ADA’s “‘maximum 
extent feasible’ requirement does not ask the court to make a 
judgment involving costs and benefits ... . The statute and 
regulations require that such facilities be made accessible 
even if the cost of doing so—financial or otherwise—is 
high.”  Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 371 
(2d Cir. 2008).  The reasoning of Roberts is sound and 
applicable in the Title II context as well.   
SEPTA also makes a more specific argument 
concerning the meaning of “maximum extent feasible” which 
relies on the interpretive appendix to 49 C.F.R. § 37.  
Appendix D states:  
                                          
10 Technical infeasibility will likely, in practice, often 
overlap with particularly excessive costs; that is, the more 
technically difficult an alteration, the more expensive it is 
likely to be.  But the ADA does contemplate that, in general, 
if a public entity cannot afford to make alterations to a public 
transit facility that include making the altered portions 
accessible, it should not make alterations at all.  “Congress 
felt that it was discriminatory to the disabled to enhance or 
improve an existing facility without making it fully accessible 
to those previously excluded.”  Kinney, 9 F.3d at 1073.  
Although this is a demanding requirement, it is consistent 




The term ‘to the maximum extent feasible’ 
should be construed as not requiring entities to 
make building alterations that have little 
likelihood of being accomplished without 
removing or altering a load-bearing structural 
member unless the load-bearing structural 
member is otherwise being removed or altered 
as part of the alteration.  
49 C.F.R. Pt. 37 App. D.  SEPTA interprets this as a 
limitation designed to prevent excessive expenditures on 
accessibility measures.  It notes that it did not remove or alter 
any load-bearing structural members in the course of its work 
in either the 15th Street Courtyard or the City Hall Courtyard.  
Therefore, it argues, it was not “feasible” to install elevators 
in either location.     
This reading, too, is unpersuasive.  The regulations 
provide that a public entity need not make altered portions of 
a facility readily accessible if doing so would require 
removing or altering a load-bearing structural member (unless 
the movement or alteration is called for by the alterations 
anyway).  They do not state, as SEPTA argues, the converse: 
that the altered portions of a facility only need be made 
accessible if the alterations in question involve the drastic 
change of moving or altering a load-bearing member.  And as 
SEPTA has not taken the position that installing an elevator 
in either location would require the removal or alteration of a 
load-bearing member, this provision of Appendix D does not 
apply on the present record. 
Therefore, SEPTA may not refuse to install elevators 
at the 15th Street Courtyard and the City Hall Courtyard 
solely because to do so would, allegedly, force SEPTA to 
incur significant costs. 
C. “Readily accessible” 
The parties also dispute the meaning of “readily 
accessible.”  SEPTA argues that the 15th Street Courtyard is a 
part of Suburban Station, not of 15th Street Station, and thus, 
since the 15th Street Courtyard may be reached from street 
level by individuals in wheelchairs via one of the Suburban 
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Station elevators, it is already “readily accessible.”11  DIA 
argues that the 15th Street Courtyard is actually a part of 15th 
Street Station, and since the facility which it is a part of is not 
wheelchair-accessible, neither is the Courtyard.  In addition, 
DIA argues that, even if the 15th Street Courtyard is part of 
Suburban Station, it is still not “readily accessible” via 
Suburban Station.   
The District Court did not make a finding as to which 
station the 15th Street Courtyard is a part of.12  Like the 
District Court, we need not address the question of which 
facility the 15th Street Courtyard belongs to because, either 
way, SEPTA must make it accessible.   
If we consider the 15th Street Courtyard Entrance to be 
part of Suburban Station, as SEPTA contends, it is still not 
“readily accessible.”  Pursuant to ADAAG § 10.1, all 
transportation facilities must comply with the applicable 
provisions of §§ 4.1 through 4.35, §§ 5 through 9, and the 
applicable provisions of § 10 of the ADAAG.  Through a 
circuitous regulatory route,13  the “new construction” 
                                          
11 SEPTA does not argue that City Hall Courtyard is 
“readily accessible,” and so there is no need to engage in this 
analysis for that Courtyard. 
12 On the first appeal, we noted that the 15th Street 
Courtyard “undisputedly provides access to” the 15th Street 
Station, and assumed that it was an entrance to that station.  
Disabled in Action, 539 F.3d at 202 n.1. 
13   Section 10.1 of the ADAAG states that “[e]very station 
… shall comply with the applicable provisions of 4.1 through 
4.35 … .”  Section 4.1.6(1)(b) mandates that “if existing 
elements, spaces, or common areas are altered, then each such 
altered element, space, feature, or area shall comply with the 
applicable provisions of 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 Minimum 
Requirements (for New Construction).”  Section 4.1.3(8) lays 
out requirements for the number of accessible entrances but 
those requirements are, in turn, modified by § 10.3.1, which 
says that, “[i]n lieu of compliance with 4.1.3(8), at least one 
entrance to each station shall comply with 4.14 [and be made 




provisions for transportation facilities, found at ADAAG § 
10.3.1, permit a public transportation provider to avoid 
making an altered entrance accessible if at least one entrance 
to the affected station is already accessible.  ADAAG § 
10.3.1(2).  However, “[i]f different entrances to a station 
serve different transportation fixed routes or groups of fixed 
routes, at least one entrance serving each group or route shall 
[be made accessible].”  Id.  Here, there is no accessible 
entrance that serves the 15th Street Station or the Market-
Frankford subway line—a  different route than those serviced 
by Suburban Station, which serves commuter rail lines.  Thus, 
even assuming that the 15th Street Courtyard Entrance is a 
part of Suburban Station, it nevertheless provides access to a 
different fixed route and therefore must be made accessible.  
If, on the other hand, the entrance at issue is a part of 15th 
Street Station, the alterations performed by SEPTA require 
that the entrance be made readily accessible since it is 
undisputed that 15th Street Station is not handicapped 
accessible.14  
Because neither the 15th Street Courtyard or the City 
Hall Courtyard is “readily accessible,”  SEPTA violated Title 
II of the ADA and the RA by not making those portions of its 
facilities accessible when it undertook to make alterations at 
those locations. 
                                          
14 SEPTA does not deny that the 15th Street Station is not 
“readily accessible.”  Instead, SEPTA argues that “[e]ven if 
an elevator were installed at the 15th Street [Courtyard 
Entrance], a person in a wheelchair could not access 15th 
Street Subway Station” because there is no wheelchair access 
from the concourse to the subway platform.  (BB at 38.)  
While SEPTA’s assertion is correct, the District Court already 
aptly addressed this issue, finding that the ADA is an 
“incremental statute.”  (App. at 26.)  According to the District 
Court, “[g]iven that eventually SEPTA will alter the stairway 
to the platform, triggering a requirement of additional 
accessibility, at that point, wheelchair-bound individuals will 
have an accessible exit waiting for them at the mezzanine 
level.”  (Id. at 22-23.)  Otherwise, to excuse public entities 
from complying with the accessibility requirements simply 
because they altered only a portion of a facility would 




D. The City as necessary party 
Finally, SEPTA argues that, because it cannot install 
an elevator at City Hall Courtyard without the agreement of 
the City, the City is a necessary party to this suit.  We may 
consider this issue despite its not being raised in the District 
Court, and we conclude that the City is not a necessary party.  
Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1980).  Under 
the Federal Rules, a party is “necessary” if, in its absence, (1) 
the court could not accord complete relief among the existing 
parties; or (2) the absent party claims an interest relating to 
the subject matter of the action so that disposing of the action 
in his absence would (i) impair its ability to adequately 
protect its interest, or (ii) leave an existing party susceptible 
to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations. Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 19(a). SEPTA bears the burden of showing why an 
absent party should be joined under Rule 19. Pittsburgh 
Logistics Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 613, 
618 (W.D. Pa. 2009). DIA claims SEPTA’s failure to assert 
this defense at an earlier stage of the proceedings renders it 
unfit for consideration on appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) 
(“Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be 
asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required.”). 
SEPTA acknowledges its failure to include this defense in 
any prior motion but nevertheless urges us to conduct an 
independent analysis.  
While the law permits us to indulge SEPTA’s 
overtures and consider this Rule 19 issue for the first time on 
appeal, the parties’ lengthy history of silence on this issue 
weighs against adopting SEPTA’s position.  We have written 
that Supreme Court jurisprudence compels us to “take steps to 
protect an absent party through consideration of the Rule 
19 issue, even when that issue was not presented to the 
district court nor raised by the parties to the appeal.” GTE 
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 598 F.2d 
790, 798 (3d Cir. 1979). However, the opinion from which 
we gleaned this obligation evinced genuine concern only for 
protecting an absent party “who of course had no opportunity 
to plead and prove his interest below.” Provident Tradesmen 




SEPTA argues that upholding the grant of summary 
judgment will, as a practical matter, impair the City's ability 
to protect its interest in City Hall Courtyard.  See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i).  However, though the City was a defendant 
in this case and was aware that it implicated access by 
individuals with disabilities to the City Hall Courtyard, it 
chose to settle with DIA.  Although it surely must be aware of 
DIA’s current position with respect to the necessity of an 
elevator in City Hall Courtyard, it has not moved to intervene, 
nor offered any other objections which we are aware of.  That 
neither the City nor SEPTA saw fit to raise this issue at an 
earlier stage of the proceedings militates against a finding that 
the City’s ability to protect its interest would be impaired 
were it not joined as a party.  The City’s normal procedures in 
dealing with SEPTA construction projects that impinge upon 
City property, such as the process of submitting plans and 
obtaining required work permits, should be sufficient to 
protect its interests here.   
SEPTA also contends that any relief granted by the 
court to DIA would be “hollow” in the absence of the City’s 
joinder, see Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 500 
F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2007).  Yet it does not actually claim 
that the City would refuse to permit construction at City Hall 
Courtyard, merely that the City’s ownership “would 
legitimately affect SEPTA’s ability to fulfill its obligations 
under the order.”  Although this is very likely true, it would 
not render a judgment in favor of DIA “hollow”; it simply 
means that SEPTA will have to work with the City in 
complying with our decision, something the City has already 
agreed to do with respect to the 15th Street Courtyard. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court=s grant of summary judgment in DIA’s favor.  
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Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, No. 09-3964 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part 
 
I am fully in agreement with the majority’s analysis of 
the obligations SEPTA has incurred under the ADA and 
associated regulations by making alterations at the 15th Street 
Courtyard,1 and, based on the precedential effect of those 
conclusions, I am strongly inclined to believe that they will 
compel the further conclusion that SEPTA bears the same 
obligations with regard to the City Hall Courtyard.  I cannot 
join Section II.D of the opinion, however, because I believe 
that the City must first be made a party to this action under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 before a decision 
regarding the City’s property can rightly be made.   
 
While SEPTA is free to begin installing an elevator at 
the 15th Street Courtyard, it is not free to do so at the City 
Hall Courtyard, which is owned by the City.  As the Majority 
notes, SEPTA acknowledges the feasibility of installing an 
elevator at the City Hall Courtyard, but it does so only “so 
                                          
1Although the Majority’s analysis is confined to the ADA, 
it concludes that the same result is required by the 
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).  Given the close relationship 
between those two statutory schemes, see McDonald v. Com. 
of Pa., Dep’t of Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Whether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or under 
the Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for determining 
liability are the same.”), I do not doubt that is so, but it is not 
necessary to assume or decide that here. 
2 
 
long as it [has] sufficient access to the property.”  (Maj. Op. 
at 4.)  Access to the property is essential and, to be properly 
granted by a court order, such access must be preceded by the 
City’s having a seat at the litigation table.  This seems self-
evident.  Ordering the construction of an elevator calls for a 
“permanent physical invasion” of the City’s property and 
“eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others from entering 
and using [the] property – perhaps the most fundamental of 
all property interests.”  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 539 (2005).  I have searched in vain for an example 
of a court ordering such an invasion without the property 
owner being joined in the case. 
 
Nevertheless, DIA argues, and the Majority accepts, 
that the District Court can afford DIA complete relief at the 
City Hall Courtyard, even though doing so would require 
SEPTA to initiate construction on the City’s land.  DIA 
implicitly acknowledges in its brief that the City might object 
to bulldozers and backhoes showing up on its property, but it 
suggests that, if the City were to bar SEPTA from making the 
required alterations, SEPTA could “assert a defense of 
impossibility to an effort by DIA to enforce the Court’s 
ruling.”  (Answering Brief of Appellee at 48 n.18.)  However, 
the very fact that the Court’s ruling could result in such an 
“impossibility” is why the City is, by the terms of Rule 19, a 
“required party” in this lawsuit.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1) 
(“A person … must be joined as a party if … in that person’s 
absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among 
existing parties … .”).2 
                                          
2 Being a “required party” under Rule 19 is contingent 
upon the party being “subject to service of process” and being 




Shifting its tack, DIA, with the Majority in tow, 
breezes past the City’s fundamental interest in this dispute by 
asserting that the City is aware of the proposal to install an 
elevator at the City Hall Courtyard and has no objection to it.  
That may well be true; indeed one hopes that the City would 
be eager to assist in every way possible the remedying of 
inaccessibility problems on its property.  But we are 
accustomed to having property owners declare their own 
interests and intentions rather than having others volunteer 
their land for construction projects.  That is why Rule 19, 
again by its exact terms, requires the joinder of someone who, 
as a practical matter, would have his ability to protect his 
interests impeded or impaired if not made a party.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i).  Making the point more powerfully, the 
Rule goes on to say that “[i]f a person has not been joined as 
required, the court must order that the person be made a 
party.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2) (emphasis added).  It does 
not say, “add that person if convenient or if you don’t already 
know what the person really wants.”  It says, 
straightforwardly, that “the court must order that the person 
be made a party.” 
 
In trying to understand what may be motivating the 
willingness to brush aside the City’s obvious interest in a 
construction project on City land, I am left to conclude that 
there is a concern over further delay in SEPTA’s beginning 
the already long-delayed start of installing necessary 
accommodations, and perhaps there is some concern that 
                                                                                              
matter jurisdiction,” conditions which the City satisfies.  FED. 




SEPTA raised the issue late as a yet another strategic move 
for procrastination.  Even if those concerns are well-founded, 
however, they do not dispose of the City’s rights.  “A person 
may be added as a party at any stage of the action on motion 
or on the court’s initiative … and a motion to dismiss, on the 
ground that a person has not been joined and justice requires 
that the action should not proceed in his absence, may be 
made as late as the trial on the merits … .”  Advisory 
Committee’s Notes on FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 
134.   
 
Nor can the City’s interests be casually dismissed by 
saying, as the Majority does, that, “[a]lthough [the City] 
surely must be aware of DIA’s current position with respect 
to the necessity of an elevator in City Hall Courtyard, it has 
not moved to intervene, nor offered any objections which we 
are aware of.”  (Maj. Op. at 17.)  That statement implies, 
without record support, that the City somehow waived its 
rights to protect its property interests in court.  The City was 
added as a party to this case in 2003 and settled with DIA in 
2004.  If anything, that history demonstrates that the City left 
the case only when it understood that its rights were no longer 
implicated.  It does not demonstrate that the City should have 
known that its rights would be implicated once again.3   
                                          
3 In its settlement agreement with DIA, the City 
acquiesced to construction of an elevator at the 15th Street 
Courtyard and agreed to permit construction of an elevator at 
Dilworth Plaza to service City Hall Station, as had “been 
discussed by SEPTA and the Plaintiffs in conceptual form for 
years.”  (App. at 89-90.)  But Dilworth Plaza is not the City 
Hall Courtyard, the location where DIA currently seeks to 




It is, moreover, somewhat ironic to observe that we are 
unaware of the City having any objection to plans for its land, 
since an important reason why a district court must join 
required parties is so that such parties have the opportunity to 
voice objections.  See Luxliner P.L. Export, Co. v. 
RDI/Luxliner, Inc., 13 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Before a 
party may be deprived of a property interest, due process 
requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.”).  We approach the problem from the wrong direction 
when our first reaction is to say to a property owner, in effect, 
“you failed to intervene at the peril of your rights,” rather 
than saying to the litigants, “you failed to add a required party 
at the peril of lengthening these proceedings while that 
party’s rights are considered.” 
 
DIA maintains, and the Majority agrees, that the City’s 
normal procedures in dealing with construction projects, such 
as requiring work permits, should be sufficient to protect its 
interests here.  Once again, though, this seems a painful 
stretch to avoid dealing with the reality that the City is a 
required party.  The City’s permitting procedures do not 
provide it with a voice in the District Court by which it can 
object to orders directly affecting its interest in its own land.  
                                                                                              
the City and SEPTA have engaged in discussions regarding 
compliance with the District Court’s order, the record does 
not reflect that any agreement was reached on the precise 
location for the installation of elevators at the City Hall 
Courtyard.  Indeed, the Statement of Compliance that SEPTA 
filed with the District Court says that the “City prefers 
installation of elevators at locations other than those directed 
by the Court.”  (App. at 1163.) 
6 
 
The permitting process is, as far as I know (and this is not an 
issue that has been briefed), designed simply to ensure that 
construction in the City is completed in accordance with 
applicable sections of the Philadelphia Code, e.g., the City’s 
building code, fire code, and electrical code.  Those 
procedures do not afford the City the opportunity to address 
to the District Court any concerns it may have about where, 
when, or how an elevator will be installed on City property. 
 
In any event, concern about significant delay is 
ultimately a matter of pure speculation, and an oddly 
contradictory bit of speculation at that.  If, as DIA and the 
Majority assume, the City has no problem at all with the 
construction of the elevator on City land, then adding the City 
as a party should involve little or no delay at all, even as it 
preserves the principles of due process that are inherent in 
Rule 19 and which long antedate the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Cf. Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U.S. 527, 532 (1892) 
(holding that, in a case involving interests in real property, 
since recovery required establishing a title that would affect 
other interested parties, those parties had to be joined).  And 
if, for some reason, the City were to raise objections, the able 
District Court can require that those objections be dealt with 
on an expedited basis, as may be appropriate. 
 
I therefore concur in the opinion of the Majority that 
the construction of the elevator at the 15th Street Courtyard is 
called for by operative federal law, but I would order the 
joinder of the City so that it can adequately voice its position 
on how that conclusion should affect its property interests in 
the City Hall Courtyard. 
 
